How plausible is moral realism? Can one be a non-realist and still be a moral objectivist?

1. According to the standard, action based ethical theories (like the ones we studied in Chapters 1-8), moral virtues have no intrinsic value but do have instrumental and derivative value (that is, agents who have the virtues are more likely to do the right acts.) Thus, the virtues are important only because they motivate right actions. Virtue ethics asserts exactly the opposite. Which do you think is more correct, and why? 2. Imagine that a superior being appears to you and says, “I am God and I am good; therefore, obey me when I tell you to torture your mother.” (In case you don’t think that a religious tradition would set forth such a message, read Genesis 22 in the Old Testament, in which God commands Abraham to kill his son Isaac, offering him as a sacrifice to God.) How would a proponent of the divine command theory deal with this problem? (Note that you will need to explain the basics of divine command theory in answering this question.) 3. How plausible is moral realism? Can one be a non-realist and still be a moral objectivist? Explain and give examples. 4. At the beginning of the text, the author said that morality served four purposes: to keep society from falling apart, to promote human flourishing, to meliorate suffering, and to justly resolve conflicts of interest. How would naturalism and emotivism respond to those purposes? Would supporters of these theories argue over whether those were indeed the correct purposes in the first place? Would they question whether there was any definite set of purpose that morality played? What are the purposes of morality suggested by each theory